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Humanity must be governed by a set of ideals. Ideals that stretch beyond what can be seen, a law 
that exists outside the realm of time and legislation, a law that invalidates what does not coincide 
with it. This law is jus cogens. As a concept, it enshrines the very essence of what makes mankind 
humane, it is shrouded in the notion of human dignity. However, as humanity develops, so do the 
contents of jus cogens? This study seeks to answer this question, firstly by ascertaining the correct 
formulation of what jus cogens actually is. This naturally leads to the question of how jus cogens 
comes about, in other words, what are the theoretical underpinnings. I posit that jus cogens arises 
out of a fiduciary relationship between the state and its citizens, and will always permeate to cater 
for the needs of its citizenry because of the same fiduciary relationship. As a result, it is this 
fiduciary relationship that is the foundation in determining the future of jus cogens and its scope. 
In order to bring clarity to the concept of jus cogens, the study recommends that a formula should 
be enshrined in treaty law for making such a determination, on what can and can’t be considered 
jus cogens. Secondly a code, law or statute enshrining all the jus cogen violations and bringing to 
life the legal principle of legality.... namely that the law should be “certain.” Lastly a mode of 
enforcement of sanctions that is able to circumvent the obstacles that international politics presents 
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CHAPTER ONE: PROPOSAL 
 
INTRODUCTION 
International law characteristically is comprised of the wills of collective sovereign states and thus 
lacks the formal structure enjoyed by national jurisdictions. States have thus recognized norms or 
obligations deemed to be of a different or higher status than others.1 These obligations may be 
erga omnes or jus cogens.2 Jus cogens as the notion of peremptory norms in international law is 
reminiscent of the distinction in Roman law between jus strictum (strict law) and jus dispositivum 
(voluntary law). Technically, jus cogens derives most of its legitimacy from the natural law 
thinking of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, according to which certain rules existed 
independent of the will of states and law makers.3 This concept has since found itself in the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) in Article 53 wherein it states that a treaty is void if, 
at the time of its conclusion it conflicts with a peremptory norm.4 
Peremptory Norms, are that body of norms from which no derogation is permitted; those norms 
recognized by the international community as a whole as being fundamental to the maintenance of 
an international legal order.5  
Erga Omnes is a quality that certain laws possess.6 Erga Omnes means that the law in question is 
binding to all states, in other words they are rights and obligations owed by states to the whole 
international community and each state has a legal interest in its implementation.7 In Barcelona 
Traction case it was enunciated that an essential distinction should be drawn between the 
obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis 
another State in the field of diplomatic protection.8 By their very nature, the former are the concern 
                                                             
1 Shaw M, International Law (Cambridge) 2008. 
2 Shaw M, International Law (Cambridge) 2008  
3 De Wet E, ‘Jus Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes’, Dinah Shelton (Ed), The Oxford Handbook on Human Rights, 
(2013). 
4 Article 53, Vienna Concention on the Law of Treaties, (1961). 
5 Peremptory norm. (n.d) West’s Encyclopedia of American law, edition 2. 2008. 
6 Ragazzi M, ‘The concept of international obligations erga omnes’, Oxford University Press, (2000). 
7  Shaw M, International Law (Cambridge) 2008. 




of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal 
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.9 Such obligations derive, for example, 
in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression,10 and of genocide,11 as 
also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including 
protection from slavery and racial discrimination.12 Some of the corresponding rights of protection 
have entered into the body of general international law others are conferred by international 
instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.13 
While there may be significant overlap between these two in terms of the content of the rules to 
which they relate, there is a difference in nature.14  The former applying to procedure and the latter 
applying to substance. Jus cogens refers to the legal status that certain obligations in international 
law get to, and obligations erga omnes pertains to the legal implications arising out of a certain 
crime’s characterization as jus cogens. Thus, these two concepts are different from each other.15  
 
                                                             
9 Bassiouni, M "International crimes: jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes." Law & Contemp. Probs. 59 (1996). 
10 This is defined by the General Assembly Resolution 3314 of 1947 which when read together with Articles 1(2) and 
39 of the United Nations give the Security Council mandate to deal with crimes of aggression. 
11 See generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, see specifically 
Articles II and III. 
12 See generally the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, more particularly Articles3-8. 
13 Barcelona Traction Case (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ.  
14 Shaw M, International Law (Cambridge 2008). 
15 Bassiouni, M "International crimes: jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes." Law & Contemp. Probs. 59 (1996). 
 
 3 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 From a theoretical standpoint, it remains a body susceptible to ambiguity, due to the fact that the 
international community, lacking legislative power can accommodate the idea of peremptory 
norms binding on all its members.16 The absence of any international legislature capable of 
imposing legal rules on all the members of the international community is a major problem, 
evidence of the shaky foundation on which the concept of jus cogens has been built.17 Void of any 
clearly defined substantial and procedural for the creation of jus cogens their emergence and 
subsequent identification could be marred based on the  political assertion and bias’ of different 
states.18 
 
JUSTIFICATION FOR STUDY 
Due to societies fluidity and ever-changing nature, the status of jus cogens norms are subject to 
change over time. This change arises due to what the international community feels is of 
peremptory status at a given point. Jus cogens are principles of law enshrining common and 
superior values shared by the international community as a whole. This being the case jus cogens 
ascribes an ethical content to the new jus gentium.19 This enshrines the reason as to why 
identification of jus cogens norms is important, it is a statement of the international communities 
attitude towards a particular issue. Whether it attains this status can only be determined by whether 
it fulfills various requirements and it is of paramount importance to understand what these 





                                                             
16 Danilenko G, “International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law Making,” European Journal of International Law.  
17 Danilenko G, “International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law Making,” European Journal of International Law. 
18 Danilenko G, “International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law Making,” European Journal of International Law. 
19 Saul M, ‘Identifying jus cogen norms: The interaction of scholars and international judges’, Asian journal of 




The author hypothesizes the following; 
1. Jus cogens gives human rights the necessary universality for its implementation. 
2. The universality attained by jus cogens norms does not trounce state sovereignty but works 
in tandem with it. 
3. Certain actors are beyond the reach of jus cogens enforcement 
4. Societal Norms are what will inform the evolution of jus cogens norms 
 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The main aim of this study is to assess the fluid nature of obligations that are in the level of jus 
cogens and the manner in which they obtain their legitimacy and position in the hierarchy of legal 
norms. In doing this various issues will be addressed. These are;  
(i) Identifying jus cogens. 
(ii) Finding out what gives certain norms jus cogens status. 




This research seeks to generally find a deeper rationalization for the concept of jus cogens in 
international law. More specifically, it seeks to answer the following questions; 
(i) What gives certain norms jus cogens status.? 
(ii) Can jus cogens be enforeced? 
(iii) Are all states accountable for breaches of jus cogens despite the disparate power that 
they yield? 






The study will be largely dependent on desktop research. Through this research the primary source 
of information will be secondary, derived from literary works by various scholars in the 
International law fraternity. These Literary works span from journal articles to textbooks. The 
same method will be used to analyse international case law in order to highlight on principles 
regarding the research topic. Primary research will also be used but not to a large extent, through 
conversations and interviews with lecturers. The information gathered from these sources will be 
collated and analyzed in an objective manner with an aim of answering the research questions and 
attaining the research objectives 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
My study will be composed of various writers attempting to answer the questions posed in my 
research questions.  
The first question as to “what is jus cogens?” will be tackled through analyzing concepts from 
various schools of thought. Namely the theory of state sovereignty, forwarded by Knuchel20 and 
Burley21 and supported by the ruling in Schooner Exchange v McFaddon22 regarding the equality 
of sovereigns and the inability of one to rule over another highlighting the principle of parim parem 
non habet imperium. The second theory that will be analysed is the constitutionalisation of 
international law, relying on the the seminal works of John Locke23 Posner,24Weatherall25 and 
Kelsen26 who all determine that jus cogens arises out of a hint of constitutionalism in international 
                                                             
20 Knuchel S, ‘State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens,’ Volume 9, Northwestern Journal of International 
Human Rights, (2011). 
21 Burley, Anne-Marie. "Law among liberal states: Liberal internationalism and the act of state doctrine." Columbia 
Law Review (1992). 
22 The Schooner Exchange V Mc’faddon 11 US 116, (1812). 
23 Locke J, “Two Treatises of Government”, McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic thought. 
24 Posner, E. "Erga omnes norms, institutionalization, and constitutionalism in international law." Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics (2009). 
25 Weatherall T, “Jus Cogens and Sovreign Immunity: Reconciling Divergence in Contemporary Jurisprudence,” 
Georgetown Journal of International Law. 
26 Kelsen H, Principles of International Law, The Lawbook Exchange (1952). 
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law limiting the power of states vis a vis each other and vis a vis their citizens.27 Lauterpacht28 and 
Hobbes29 advance Constitutionalism and Public theory of law being both the reason states adhere 
to jus cogens and why these norms arise. Lastly is the Fiduciary theory of jus cogens advanced by 
Criddle.30 This is the theory from which the bulk of this paper will rely. Borrowing from his 
aversions that the state adheres to jus cogen norms because they hold these rights for the citizenry 
in trust. Rights that arise due to the International universal conscience.  
In answering the questions of whether new norms will be formed, the work of Judge Cancado 
Trinidade will be the focal point of discussion. Namely his rulings in The Advisory Opinion on the  
Juridical Condition and the Rights of Undocumented Migrants31 and his paper on the  analysis of 
jus cogens.32 Lastly an analysis on the enforceability of jus cogen norms will be assessed through 






                                                             
27 Posner, E. "Erga omnes norms, institutionalization, and constitutionalism in international law." Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics (2009). 
28 Lauterpacht H, Law of Treaties: Report by Special Rapporteur, [1953] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 90, 93, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/63. 
29 Hobbes T, Leviathan or The Matter, Forme, & Power, printed for Andrew Crooke, at the Green Dragon in St. Pauls 
Church-yard 1651. 
30 Criddle E and Fox-Decent E, “A fiduciary theory Jus Cogens” Yale Journal of International Law, (2009). 
31 Advisory Juridical Condition and the Rights of Undocumented Migrants, IACtHR, Judgment, 17th September 2003. 
32 Cancado A, “The Determination and Gradual Expansion of its Material Content in Contemporary International Case 
Law,” XXV Curso de Derecho Internacional Organizado por el Comité Jurídico Interamericano, (2008). 
 




CHAPTER TWO: A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO JUS COGENS 
THERORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The theories justifying jus cogens are the reason the same is on a collision course with state 
sovereignty. The tensions between state sovereignty and jus cogens have led to lengthy and 
protracted discussions. This was before Article 53 was a provision under the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties. Essentially, Article 53 scales down the power of states to contract on 
matters which are deemed contrary to the objects of the international community as expressed by 
jus cogens.  
It is axiomatic that international law draws much of its legitimacy form the wills of nation to be 
together under one regime that ensures uniformity. However, there is also the factor of 
enforcement, which raises uncertainty as to whether the violators of international law can be held 
to account for their wrongs.34 This being the case, the veracity of international law as law is further 
thrown into confusion. In the case of jus cogens which is a more amorphous idea, these concerns 
are magnified.35 This paper contends that there must be a different theoretical framework apart 
from natural law that grants jus cogens its peremptory status in law. This chapter shall therefore 
point out the shortcomings of the current theoretical and institutional order in engendering 
obedience to international law, then it shall delve into the fiduciary theory of jus cogens after which 
it shall draw conclusions.36 
THE THEORY OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
Under the current theoretical framework of jus cogens, the closest we can get to a justification is 
what is offered by natural law. The basis for the legal force behind natural law is nature and reason 
which binds all persons in the case of contemporary jurisprudence. This makes all persons 
subservient regardless of the fact that they may be “sovereign,” severely curtailing the power of 
                                                             
34 Bassiouni, M "International crimes: jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes." Law & Contemp. Probs. 59 (1996). 
35 Christenson, G. "Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society." Virginia Journal of 
International Law, (1987). 
36 Criddle  E & Fox-Decent E, “The Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens” The Yale Journal of International Law, (2009). 
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any state. It is common knowledge that this power of the sovereign is what is deemed to be the 
basis of the principle of state sovereignty.37 
The principle of parim parem non habet imperium is widely understood as the equality of states, 
it is an expression of non interference and respect for the sovereignty of other states.38 This means 
that nation states are on the same level in which case beyond the sovereign there is no other source 
of power. States are thus the determinants of what the law is on the international plane. All 
sovereign states are expected to respect the sovereignty of other sovereign states regardless of the 
size of the state they lead or the population of the countries. This is in consonance with the 
provisions of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights of States in Article 4 respectively which 
says states are juridicially equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal capacity in their exercise.39 
The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which it possesses to assure its exercise, but 
upon the simple fact of its existence as a person in international law.40  This does not give specific 
numbers or land areas that will qualify a group of people under one government as a state in 
international law.  
The principle of state equality is so crucial to the international community, it is the basis of state 
doctrine and is also the basis of sovereign immunity. These two are fundamental to the peaceful 
coexistence of the international community because they determine the relationship between states 
and ensure that the sovereigns can interact without the possibility of being subjected to the 
ignominy of trial or arrest in the territory of a different state.  
The act of state doctrine is that the acts of a sovereign state cannot be challenged by another state 
if they are performed in the process of its governance.41 Essentially, the court in Kenya cannot 
determine the legality of anti sodomy laws that were passed in Uganda. Moreover, it is an act that 
may only lead to the souring of relations between the two states since the only conclusion that 
                                                             
37 Dinstein Y (1966). Par in Parem non Habet Imperium. . , 1, pp 407-420 available at 
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract;jsessionid=32E16E6DBB84A9E0D35EE27D781F02A6.journa
ls?fromPage=online&aid=8628999 accessed on 2/7/2016 
38 Toliekyte N, “The concept of state immunity”, POLITIKA KAIP TUŠČIA VIETA, (2007).  
39 The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States is a treaty signed at Montevideo, Uruguay, on 
December 26, 1933 
40 Article 4, Montevideo Convention, (1933).  
41 Burley, Anne-Marie. "Law among liberal states: Liberal internationalism and the act of state doctrine." Columbia 
Law Review (1992). 
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would be drawn in these circumstances is that Kenya has no respect for the capacity of Uganda to 
rule itself absent of external interference.  
On the other hand, sovereign immunity is the doctrine that a representative of a state cannot be 
subjected to the jurisdiction of municipal courts of another state. International law has to recognize 
the legal equality of states on the international plane otherwise most states which would feel taken 
for granted as less powerful states may disregard international law and its jurisdiction. The 
outcome of this would be to have an international law regime on paper that is not enforceable due 
to the absence of the will on the part of the members of the international community. In a nutshell, 
the principle advances two salient positions that are coterminous in both substance and form:42 
a) The exclusive and unlimited exercise of jurisdiction by a state within its boundaries; 
b) The equality of states in which case they cannot and should never rule over each other. 
This is aptly captured by CJ Marshall in the case of The Schooner Exchange v Mc’Faddon43 
where the learned judge expressed himself as follows:44 
“The full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign, 
and being incapable of conferring extraterritorial power, would not seem to contemplate 
foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign being in no 
respect amenable to another; and being bound by obligations of the highest character not 
to degrade the dignity of his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights within the 
jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express 
license, or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign 
station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended 
to him”.45 
From the foregoing, there is a clear gospel on what the learned judge was expressing which is 
coterminous to the absolute power of the sovereign to deal in whatever manner they deemed fit. 
                                                             
42Knuchel S, ‘State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens’. Volume 9, Northwestern Journal of International 
Human Rights, (2011). 
43 The Schooner Exchange V Mc’faddon 11 US 116, (1812) 
44 The Schooner Exchange V Mc’faddon 11 US 116, (1812) 
45 The Schooner Exchange V M’faddon, (1812) 
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This was applicable in cases where leaders of sovereign states were deemed beyond reproach and 
their actions were law. However, history has shown us that with the development of jurisprudence 
and evolution from belief that the sovereign was granted powers by a higher sovereign, ordinarily 
God or nature, jurisprudence moved to a more dialectical approach that perceived the sovereign as 
any other human capable of fallibility and whose powers also needed to be circumscribed by the 
law. The writings of John Locke on government give a clear movement in the case of the United 
Kingdom form an absolute monarchy to a constitutional democracy.46 
The next section traces the movement of international law from absolute sovereignty to a modified 
theory of sovereignty.  
THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The weakness in the doctrine of absolute state sovereignty is what has led to an alteration of the 
doctrine to a milder status. This is especially highlighted by the ever growing awareness of the 
need to have a people centered approach to human rights. There is a possibility that the sovereign 
may not concern himself with the rights of the people he or she is leading culminating, in the 
violation of those people’s rights. This situation would only be made worse if the international 
community continued to approach international law form the lenses of absolute state sovereignty. 
As it is, leaders or sovereigns are human and may also occasion injustice to the people they are 
tasked to lead.  
Absolute sovereignty implies that the entire international community will not interfere with the 
internal affairs of states even if there are violations that run afoul human rights.47 Ultimately, on 
the basis of the needs of the people who are being led, there is need to modify the theory of absolute 
state sovereignty, in its stead a new set of norms that allows the international community to 
interfere in the event of state occasioned injustice. This has been given more impetus by the 
                                                             
46 The first treatise explains the fallacies of theories that suggested the divine nature of the monarchy being premised 
on the understanding that the sovereignty of the King was God given and not subject to questioning. The Kings were 
God given to lead and the Subjects were to obey. Largely, the basis of this was the biblical understanding of Kingdoms. 
In the second treatise, the author eruditely explains the true understanding, legitimacy and extent of a civil government, 
being that the basic source of power is the people and that they do enter into a social contract with the sovereign who 
ought to lead within the bounds of the social contract. Dunn, J. The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical 
Account of the Argument of the'Two Treatises of Government'. Cambridge University Press, 1982. 
The works of other enlightenment authors such as Hugo Grotius, Immanuel Kant and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are 
instructive in this light. They are the foremost authors who led the procession towards a more civil government and 
democratic rights. 
47 International Court of Justice advisory opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence. (Kosovo Case). 
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establishment of the International Criminal Court by the Rome Statue which operates to try 
suspects of crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression.48 The International 
community must therefore seek out a way in which the immunity of sovereigns is curtailed in the 
event they are believed to have occasioned injustice or have violated the rights of persons. 
A keen analysis of the foregoing suggests the need for certain norms which are over and above the 
sovereignty of the state, in which case their violation will expose the sovereign to responsibility. 
It then becomes the responsibility of the international community to assist in the apprehension of 
such offenders who violate the rights of those led. Herein lies the parallelism with the two treatises 
of government as was expounded by John Locke49. Essentially, the obligation of the states to the 
international community as a whole, erga omnes,50 and the peremptory norms make it imperative 
that sovereigns respect certain rules because they are responsible for a certain people who may not 
necessarily agree with the acts of such sovereigns. Herein lies the fiduciary theory of jus cogens 
which does not take the glow away from the all-encompassing doctrine of state immunity but gives 
the sovereign a greater sense of responsibility against which he can be held to account.  
In the end, the overarching rules which bind the sovereigns, act as constitutions against which the 
legality of their actions are measured. Jus cogens, by definition cannot be derogated from and any 
state or sovereign that violates jus cogens and erga omnes obligations are not protected by the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity.51 According to Ernst-Ulrich, Constitutionalism simply implies 
the fundamental binding normative constraints on state action.52 In our case, the erga omnes 
obligations as under human rights law and the Rome statue clearly proscribe the extent to which 
the laws of the international community can extend.  
According to Posner the limitation of the immunity of the sovereign on the basis of parim parem 
non habet imperium which derives from the equality of states. It is an expression of non 
interference and respect for the sovereignty of other states.53 This according to Posner is evidence 
of a mild case of constitutionalism in international law. It also determines the domain of the 
                                                             
48 Article 5, Rome Statute, (1998). 
49 Locke J, “Two Treatises of Government,” McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic thought. 
50 Maurizio R, The Concept of International Obligations Erga Omnes, Clarendon Press (1997). 
51 Weatherall T, “Jus Cogens and Sovereign Immunity: Reconciling Divergence in Contemporary Jurisprudence”, 
Georgetown Journal of International Law, (2016). 
52 Petersmann, E, “Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of International Economic Law” Volume 3, 
Progress and Undercurrents in public international law, University Press  (1991). 
53 Toleikyte N, The Concept of State Immunity and The Main Challenges, Vilinius University Lithuaina.  
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sovereign as an agent of the people he is leading in which case he must act within these bounds. 
He expresses himself as follows:54 
‘‘Perhaps not everyone would call this system “constitutional,” a word that can be 
given thicker or thinner meanings. The case for using this term in the present context 
is that here governments do not have the discretion to refuse to press the claim of an 
affected person. When that person is a citizen of the state ruled by that government, 
the government, in effect, agrees that an external institution will limit its authority over 
its own citizens.’’  
The constitution is the grund norm that guides the operations of government and its violation is 
unconscionable. According to Hans Kelsen, the grund norm, regardless of whether the subjects of 
the law accept it, is omnipotent and binding.55 This theory of constitutional law will have the 
sovereigns as the proper subjects of jus cogens and erga omnes obligations.  
COSNTITUTIONALISM AND THE PUBLIC THEORY OF LAW 
The now covert conflict between these two theories therefore required a unification that will still 
engender the reverence required for the utility of jus cogens and erga omnes. As stated previously, 
the two doctrines of jus cogens and erga omnes place demands on sovereigns and require them to 
accede some power. This is in line with what the ICJ has termed contra bonos mores at the 
international level in that there are certain acts that will violate international public policy.56 It is 
international public policy that states will not commit genocide or condone the same because they 
are under a fiduciary duty to the same people.57 It is contrary to the moral conscience of the 
international community if such conduct were to go without scrutiny. 
Essentially, the imperative norms of international law as expressed in jus cogens have been termed 
as the rules on international public policy by authors such as Lauterpacht.58 In this case, they 
override any others sets of norms. This is typified by the veneration of the Universal Declaration 
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of Human Rights59 which sets out standard and norms which have found their way into the 
municipal laws of countries.60 
There is consensus that peremptory norms do not derive their legitimacy from state consent. They 
transcend the will of states. This being the case they override the immunity of a sitting sovereign. 
This for example is why there have been warrants issued against President Omar Al Bashir for 
crimes of genocide.61 Essentially, they therefore derive their legitimacy in theory from the 
fiduciary theory of jus cogens. This holds the leaders accountable to the people they lead. It is the 
people they represent that give the leaders or government the legitimacy to act in relation to other 
states. This is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that serves to remind us that the power 
is in the people and the law derives its legitimacy from the people who make it and determine its 
extent.  Essentially, this is similar to the arguments of Thomas Hobbes in his book the Leviathan.62 
With reference to the concept of the Commonwealth, it is argued that the power of the sovereign 
is derived from the people and that the people are the reason for the existence of the sovereign who 
exercises power as conferred to him. He states as follows in Part II of the book concerning the 
commonwealth and the need for these people to have a social contract with the sovereign who in 
turn helps move the people from their brutish state of nature: 
The final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over 
others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live 
in Commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented 
life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of 
war which is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown, to the natural passions of 
men when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of 
punishment to the performance of their covenants...63 
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This being the case, the sovereign is enthroned by the people and derives his said authority form 
the people. In extrapolation, he is therefore supposed to act to the benefit of the people. Credit goes 
to Montesquieu for realizing that power can corrupt such leaders who in turn end up violating the 
rights of those who have given them the power to lead.64 In the event they do not act in accordance 
with the power granted to them by the social contract, essentially the constitution in the modern 
era, they must be held not to be immune from prosecution by the entire international community. 
Therefore, the same way constitutions create governments as agents of the people, under 
international law, governments must be viewed under jus cogens as the agents of the states they 
represent and that their acts cannot enjoy immunity if they acts ultra vires the powers under which 
they have been made leaders. This should still hold, notwithstanding the lack of clarity as to 
whether the international community can sustain an injury to necessitate the obligation placed 
against the sovereign to act conscientiously. 
RATIONALIZATION OF THE FIDUCIARY THEORY OF JUS COGENS 
The fiduciary theory of jus cogens gains legitimacy as a means of establishing an overarching 
theory that fully explains the need for international law subjects to comply with the same. Hitherto, 
the theories of natural law, public order and positivism do not fully rationalize the deposing of the 
fundamental position of the state at the apex of international law. As a matter of fact, the European 
Court of Human Rights has rejected the notion that jus cogens can override state sovereignty.65 In 
the case of Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, the court was categorical that it could not countenance 
a rule of international law that could theoretically depose state sovereignty. The argument was that 
the same would throw the entire international order into disarray and confusion.66 
Therefore, borrowing form Kant’s understanding of the place of the state, the theory of a fiduciary 
relationship attempts to find a theoretical understanding of jus cogens. This will aide in the 
development of jus cogen, especially in international human rights cases. The fiduciary theory 
goes beyond mere recognition which hitherto has not improved beyond the recognition as being 
imperative under Article 53 of the VCLT. In the main, this debate grants the ICJ and other tribunals 
the foundational basis to deal with the harmonization of the concept of state sovereignty and jus 
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cogens which on the face of it are counterintuitive in effect. There are many other instances where 
the ICJ has decided not to override the concept of state sovereignty on the basis of a clash between 
jus cogens and other more established norms and state consent.67  
THE THEORY: INNATE DIGNITY 
Under fiduciary relations, there is a duty of the person with the power to act in a manner that is 
coterminous to the inherent dignity of the person subject to the power. The social contract gives 
the sovereign the power to act within the territory.68 The power is granted to the sovereign by law 
as the official power to exercise governance over the people it rules over. This is a social contract 
as it were. Under all contracts, there are rights and obligations between the parties to the contract. 
In this case, there are also rights and obligations.  
Immanuel Kant used the example of children and parents wherein the parents are under an 
obligation to act as good fiduciaries over their children who have inherent dignity as human 
beings.69 This has undertones of the social contract theory as explained in the preceding paragraph. 
Therefore, the fiduciary theory owes most of its foundational perspectives to the theory of the 
social contract. The benefit of such a theory is it moves from abstract conceptions such as 
international conscience and international public order as the underpinning theoretical 
understanding.70 
This understanding deviates from the amorphous nature of natural law, public order and 
conscience. It also avoids the technicalities that are involved in the international positive law. We 
find ourselves in a practical approach. An approach that concerns itself with practical challenges 
to the current international order, responding and going a step ahead in explaining why states ought 
to comply as may be required of them by the international community. 
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According to Michael, the human rights of the subjects of a particular sovereignty form the basis 
for the doctrine of sovereignty.71 Criddle and Fox, aver that this originates from Kantian ideas of 
fiduciary duties, it borrows heavily form natural law as the preeminent source of law, however 
they argue that a distinction arises, in that this theory does not force itself upon the reader on the 
basis of deeply cherished and innate norms.72 Quite on the contrary, it is an appreciation of the fact 
that on the basis of the fiduciary relations, there arises a duty of care and with it a responsibility to 
ensure that the actions of one do not violate the duty of care. 
The authors go further to argue that the basis of public law and to be more particular administrative 
role is the fiduciary nature of government power.73 As a matter of fact, the reason as to why a 
government is bound by treaties that were entered into by a preceding government is because a 
government is held to be a fiduciary of the people.74 It shall be there and it shall go.75 On the basis 
of this fiduciary relationship, it must act in good faith and take into consideration the rights of the 
subjects and the successive governments which will represent the same people.76 
The foregoing then according to Fox and Criddle forms the basis for the illegality of acts such as 
slavery, genocide among others which are essentially crimes against the persons who are subjects 
of the state.77 In the long run we find that under the fiduciary duty the state is under the ordinary 
principles of reasonableness and integrity which form the foundation of most if not all accepted 
interactions between persons whether natural or juridical. 
In drawing primarily form Immanuel Kant and the seminal work of Fox and Criddle, we have a 
better theoretical explanation of the need to have jus cogens and erga omnes obligations which 
bind all players at the international plane. It is therefore important to note that this theory only 
serves to rationalize jus cogens and does not create jus cogens on its own. It helps in the 
identification of jus cogens and gives a factual basis of the need for states to abide by jus cogens 
because of their role as fiduciaries of the people. 
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CHAPTER THREE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF JUS 
COGENS 
This ordering, which developed from the customary way in which things were done would stop 
different states form derogating on the requirement to abide by the previous rules of engagement 
despite the lack of a clearly promulgated legal framework. This chapter to delves into a finer 
category of international obligations. These are norms or customs from which players on the 
international plane are not allowed to derogate.  These are called jus cogens or peremptory norms. 
The chapter shall endeavor to bring to the fore the concept of jus cogens. It shall also analyze its 
historical development henceforth attempt to locate the theoretical place of jus cogens under the 
ambit of international law.  
WHAT IS JUS COGENS? 
Jus cogens is a Latin term which translates to mean peremptory norms.78  In international law jus 
cogens  refers to those norms that states and other subjects of international must abide to. Failure 
to which they will have committed serious breaches.79.A state, in relating with another 
international actor or persons will be required to abide by certain standards. The state will expect 
a certain level of treatment in relation to issues such as equality between states, immunity of 
diplomatic agents and restraint form the use of force unless serious need arises. In other words, the 
rules of jus cogens tale the status of international Constitutional law.80 
There is no clear catalogue of the rules of international law that have been given jus cogens status 
apart from other rules of customary international law, however, there is consensus as to what some 
of these rules of jus cogens are.81 For instance, it is common ground among members of the 
international community that acts of slavery are jus cogens . It must be noted that in the past, before 
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the emergence of human rights slavery and the trafficking of slaves form certain countries was 
deemed to be lawful.82 This was before the evolution of human rights movement which led to the 
development of the need to respect the inherent right of a human being in spite of the color of their 
skin or their country of origin.83  
Other examples of jus cogens include the prohibition against genocide which is now succinctly 
provided for under the Rome statute and the procedure therein,84 there’s also the prohibition 
against the taking of a territory that belonged to a country other than the one that seeks to annex, 
and lastly the prohibition against maritime piracy.85 A keen look at these prohibitions illustrates 
that they ought to be there for international law to work as it ought. There is no way peace can be 
observed if for instance states are allowed to take away the territories of another arbitrarily. 
Additionally, were it not for the prohibition against the use of force by Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter, wars would break out every day.86 
By dint of the reverence for jus cogens, international law has developed to the effect that these 
peremptory norms cannot be derogated from even by two states which enter into a treaty that 
violates what the international community deems to have attained jus cogens status.87 This position 
is expressed in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which is explicit that 
a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law.88 This provision gives a hint as to the status jus cogens. They can be deemed to 
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be the grund norm of international law by custom or by treaty in that they set out the basis upon 
which all other rules of international law derive their legitimacy and force of law.89  
In this introductory stage of the discussion, it is important to note that the very existence of jus 
cogens as a source form whence we draw international law norms is robustly debated and 
challenged.90 As earlier noted, there is no concrete consensus among highly publicized writers that 
there is such a things as peremptory norms. On the basis of the principles of state sovereignty, it 
has been argued extensively by some scholars that states are like the legislative assemblies within 
the framework of municipal law.  In which case they themselves are the source of law being the 
representatives chosen for that particular task.91  
 
FORMAL DISCUSSIONS ON JUS COGENS: THE WATERSHED 
After the first world war, we saw what could be assumed to be the first step in formally recognizing 
jus cogens. Article 20 of the Covenant on the League of Nations92 provided that it was illegal for 
members of the league to enter into bilateral or multilateral treaties that would water down the 
objects of the League of Nations or that were contrarian in approach to the text of the Covenant of 
the League of Nations. In the Oscar Chinn case, Judge Schückin interpreted the provisions of 
Article 20 to be of the effect of impeding members of the League form certain conduct.  In his 
individual opinion, he stated that the provision would be useless if members of the international 
community could make treaties that were contrary to the said Article.93 Thereafter, judicial opinion 
was to the effect that there were certain rules of law drawn from common practice and the 
generality of nature that were binding upon the actions of states in entirety.94 Furthermore, the 
Convention on the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide95 which in its decision, the International 
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Court of Justice stated that there were certain veritable norms which were not derogable and that 
states were bound to obey or abide by. In the case of this current convention, the court was of the 
opinion that the individual states did not have, on the basis of the text of the treaty latitude or 
individual rights and by extension once they had ratified the same, they were bound to abide by 
the provisions of the Convention.96 
Towards the Vienna Conference, in the discussions between states, there was a general feeling that 
there were certain rules that states could not derogate.97 According to the ILC, the general feeling, 
that the sustainability of the principle of state sovereignty in will and capacity to enter into all 
manner of contracts was no longer sustainable.98 It must be noted that at this time there had already 
been suggestions to appoint a committee of experts that would be tasked with checking the moral 
content of treaties as against the existing needs of the international community.99 Incase certain 
treaties were found to be inconsistent with the conscience of the international community, the 
same, as per the proposals would be declared void.100 At the end of the Conference whose 
preparations had started in 1949, Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
provided for certain peremptory norms in international law which could not be derogated from,101 
however, as the case still appears to be today, there is no clear consensus as to what really 
constitutes jus cogens.102 There is little that has been done in the development of the concept of 
jus cogens by the competent international tribunals.103 However, academic debate has been livelier 
than ever.104 
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JUS COGENS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW  
Primarily, the identification of jus cogens leads to some conclusions regarding the relationship 
between jus cogens and customary international law. To some scholars jus cogens and customary 
international sources as the same105 and others distinguish between the two.106 This leads to the 
ambiguity as to whether jus cogens forms part of Customary International Law.107 Foremost, jus 
cogens like customary international law requires that there is some form of uniformity in 
international acceptance. However, the distinction between the two as regards acceptance is that 
in the case of jus cogens, the acceptance is almost required to come from the entire globe.. Jus 
Cogen norms are a subset of customary international law, this presumption was stated in both the 
Nicaragua Case where it stated “which held that the prohibition of the use of force is ‘not only a 
principle of customary international law but also a fundamental or cardinal principle of such 
law.”108 And The Obligation to Extradite and Prosecute which held the same sentiments in stating 
“the prohibition of torture is part of customary law and has become a peremptory norm (jus 
cogens), and is “grounded in a widespread international practice and on the opinio juris of 
States.”109 
According to Baker, certain rules of customary international law are considered so vital that they 
cannot be contracted out of by individual states, such preemptory rules are labeled jus cogens 
norms.110 It is the mental, or subjective element that oxymoronically gives customary law its jus 
cogen status, Opinio juris plays a key role in elevating a regular customary international norm into 
a jus cogens norm,111 for only when the majority of states in the international system believe that 
a regular customary international norm cannot be persistently objected to, or contracted out of, 
does this regular norm achieve elevation to jus cogens.112 
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In essence, they are needful for the efficient coexistence of the international community and the 
derogation from them ought not to be allowed. Therefore there exists a higher species of rules of 
customary international law, rules which bind the entire globe. The best approach to explain such 
an elevated place in the hierarchy of norms is with reference to perhaps the natural school of law. 
This instructs that there are certain necessary rules of international law, essentially, these rules 
would exist whether or not the states are observing them or have developed them by state practice 
but they command utmost respect. It is therefore the conclusion of this section that the two share 
this point limited to the fact that jus cogens requires that the acceptance be of a global scale 
 
ELEMENTS OF JUS COGENS  
As it stands, common elements have been identified that are useful in the identifying jus cogens. 
This section shall highlight them and seek a theoretical approach to the entire concept.  Moreover, 
the theoretical justification of jus cogens is important in the process of identifying jus cogens.  
Accordingly, in its contemporary description, jus cogens has the following characteristics: 
a) The norm must be one of general international law;113 
In essence, it must be the case that the said norm is binding on all members of the international 
community.114  The importance of this point is to distinguish jus cogens from other norms which 
are recognized by a particular section of the international community while at the same time not 
applicable to others. (Not all norms of general international law have the character of jus 
cogens.)115 The acceptance ought not to be only general but must bear towards recognition by the 
globe as a whole.116 Having such a wide sweeping applicability is essentially what gives such 
norms the venerable status that is above what we would consider Customary International Law.  
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b) The derogation from the same must be impermissible. 117 
It could be stated that this is the main feature of jus cogens.118  It must be the case that any form 
of derogation  from such a norm is not acceptable.119 The only acceptable derogation must be 
where the derogation is necessitated by a new norm that has overtaken the former.120 However, 
with time, society is refined and perhaps the particular norms, no matter how fundamental they are 
may change or be overtaken by events. This is where the line between obligations erga omnes and 
jus cogens thins. However, international norms that rise to the status of jus cogens constitute 
obligatio erga omnes.121 In essence, erga omnes are obligations that that are owed  to the entire 
international community arising out of their jus cogens status, hence erga omnes and jus cogens 
concepts are usually presented as two sides of the same coin.122  The practical application of erga 
omnes obligations as by states against others was highlighted in Barcelona traction123 case 
whereby by they stated “An essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a 
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in 
the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In 
view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.”124 
 Therefore, to some extent, such rules are necessary for international public order or take the form 
of urgency that is bestowed upon them by their capacity to engender international justice or reduce 
human suffering.  On the basis of such theoretical justifications, we find the reason for the status 
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of ‘non derogability’.  Moreover, they ought to be pivotal to international order; and apart from 



















CHAPTER FOUR: ENFORCEMENT AND GRADUAL EXPANSION OF 
JUS COGENS IN CASE LAW 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND JUS COGENS ENFORCEMENT 
In general, International Law is criticized for the lack of enforcement mechanisms.125 In my 
conversations my lecturer126, he opined, and an opinion I aptly agree with, that the conversation 
on whether jus cogens is law and whether it can be enforced are two different issues altogether. 
The USA and enforcement of peremptory norms is an all too clear indication of the difficulty of 
enforcement of peremptory norms. 
It is incontrovertible that the prohibition of the unilateral use of force is a fundamental aspect of 
the United Nations (U.N.) era system for governing the relations between states.127 As set out in 
the UN charter128 it is often seen as archetypal example of a jus cogens norm.129 The Nicaragua 
Case130 was the first instant in which the jus cogens status of the prohibition against use of force 
was dealt with, the I.C.J in its ruling expressed the view that "the law of the Charter concerning 
the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in 
international law having the character of jus cogens.131 Furthermore that the United States were in 
breach of this obligation and should pay reparations to Nicaragua. This notwithstanding the United 
States refused to participate in the proceedings at the I.C.J and blocked the enforcement of the 
judgment by the United Nations Security Council from obtaining compensation.132 
Article 39 of the UN Charter states that The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
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international peace and security.133 The United States and the United Kingdom went on an invasion 
in Iraq deploying over 150,000 troops.134 Although aggression is yet to be define in international 
law this seems to be a good indicator of what it might be. Notwithstanding the actions by the two 
world powers, the security council fails to act with the mandate given to it under Article 41351 or 
42.136 
Both instances are clear violations of jus cogens norms however the international community 
namely the security council have failed to act. The U.S. military invasion of Iraq in March 2003 
was an illegal war of aggression that took place without any specific authorization of the Security 
Council and in the absence of any justification for self-defense under Article 51 of the UN 
Charter.137 
This begs the question, although jus cogens is legitimate law, and the veracity of international law 
cannot be questioned, is its enforcement political? Are jus cogens norms really enforceable against 
the United States and other permanent members of the security council? 
“despite all the sufferings of past generations, there persist in our days new forms of exploitation 
of man by man, illustrated by the increasing disparities among and within nations, amidst chronic 
and growing poverty, up rootedness, social exclusion and marginalization, - does not mean that 
“regulation is lacking” or that Law does not exist to remedy or reduce such man-made imbalances. 
It rather means that Law is being ostensibly and flagrantly violated, from day to day, to the 
detriment of millions of human beings.”138  
This coincides Mr Desmond Tutu’s initial assertion, that a lack of enforcement does not necessarily 
mean a lack of laws. In agreement with Mr Desmond Tutu, although direct enforcement might not 
be possible, its pronunciation acts as a deterrent. 
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EXPANSION OF THE CONTENTS OF JUS COGENS  
New conceptions of the kind (jus cogens), impose themselves in our days, their faithful observance 
will be dependent on the evolution of contemporary International Law.139According to Judge 
Trindade, jus cogens does not arise due to the inscrutable will of states, but due to the opinion juris 
communis or rather the human conscience.140 In The Advisory Opinion on the  Juridical Condition 
and the Rights of Undocumented Migrants 141 Judge Cancado Trindade maintained that jus cogens 
is not a closed juridical category but rather one in evolution and expansion.142 He goes on to aver 
that jus cogens is an open category which expands itself to the extent that the universal juridical 
conscience awakens for the necessity to protect the rights inherent to each human being in every 
situation.143 As was stated earlier jus cogen’s evolution is predicated on the evolution of the 
conscience of the international world order. For as as long as rights are evolving so to is the 
conscience of jus cogens. As these rights evolve, they are deposited in trust by the citizens of the 
world to the state as fiduciaries of the same. 
 
The evolution of the aforementioned jurisprudential construction ought to be appreciated in a wider 
dimension.144 In reaction to the successive atrocities which, along the XXth century, victimized 
millions and millions of human beings, in a scale until then unknown in the history of humankind, 
the universal juridical conscience.145 Burst forth as never before, as the ultimate material source 
of law.146 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This last aims at bringing together the findings of the entire research and seeks to analyze whether 
the questions the research set out to answer have been answered exhaustively. The conclusions 
that shall be drawn from the research shall be the basis for the succeeding section, which shall 




Jus cogens is an integral part of the international legal order because certain crimes and actions 
affect the interests of the world and shock the conscience of humanity.147 Trouble arises when 
trying to create a legal order with no international legislative order that should bind mankind’s 
actions. Although it was concluded that jus cogens are first customary norms that attain a certain 
an elevated status, explaining the reason that it applies world over, without the need for continued 
state practice and the ability to be a perpetual objector leads to some ambiguity. This leads to 
obvious issues of enforcement, certainty, consent and state sovereignty. An expose into the 
underpinnings of jus cogens was necessary to establish what exactly informs the doctrine and the 
norms. If it is natural law then their need be no promulgation, if it is positive law then the norms 
should all be enshrined in legal instruments, if its public order theory then jus cogens is merely an 
instrument of social control. Due to the fact that the international order is a melting pot of “equals” 
then state sovereignty would be the main antagonist to all these approaches. How best can jus 
cogens and state sovereignty coexist, in my view they’re both indispensable. It is the view of this 
paper that the fiduciary theory is the only theory that adequately rationalizes both the scope and 
nature of jus cogens. State sovereignty and jus cogens are no longer at polar ends, they work 
together to preserve the dignity of mankind.148 This is due to the fiduciary relationship that arises 
between a state and its subjects,149 a relationship that ensures that the rights, in the form of jus 
cogen norms are held in trust for the people by the state and explains its universal application. 
The enforceability of jus cogens is a concept that must be separated from its veracity as law. This 
paper avers that enforceability is dependent on factors enshrined in more than law, that political 
persuasions take the day. This is especially true in situations involving violation of jus cogens by 
permanent members to the security council as was seen in Nicaragua and Iraq.  
Lastly this paper concludes by determining the future of jus cogens. Whether new norms can be 
formed, based on the work of Cancado, it is the view of this paper that new norms will materialize 
as the conscience of the international community develops to accommodate for more human rights 
                                                             
147 Bassiouni, M. Cherif. "International crimes: jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes." Law & Contemp. Probs. 59 
(1996). 
148 Criddle E and Fox-Decent E, A fiduciary theory Jus Cogens , Yale Journal of International Law, (2009). 
149 Criddle E and Fox-Decent E, A fiduciary theory Jus Cogens , Yale Journal of International Law, (2009). 
 
 30 
that it believes to be of paramount importance. As the scopes of rights grows, so to will the scope 
of jus cogens. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of these conclusions there is still some ambiguity and uncertainty as regards the fiduciary 
approach to jus cogens. This has led to the following recommendations: 
EXPANSION OF ARTICLE 53 OF THE VCLT. 
That there be a clear methodology enshrined in Treaty law on jus cogens apart from the provisions 
of Article 53 and 64 of the VCLT and spasmodic expressions on the said topic by the International 
Court of Justice. This would allow a clear distinction between the norms of jus cogens and those 
that are merely customary international law and haven’t or are yet to attain the requisite status. If 
this is done, there is a better chance of enforcement since the international tribunals will be clear 
as to what has been agreed on by the states as forming jus cogens. 
 This requires an expansion of Article 53. Expansion of Article 53 would be both an exhaustive 
list of what draft articles, customary law and case law have envisaged to be jus cogen norms. This 
would fulfill the requirement of the principle of legality in law. The principle of legality is a core 
value, a human right but also a fundamental defense in criminal law prosecution according to 
which no crime or punishment can exist without a legal ground.150 In order for there to exist a legal 
ground for enforcement of jus cogens its tenets must be known and enshrined in a legal instrument. 
As regards enforcement of Jus Cogen Norms The envisaged intervention of the security council 
as is seen in Article 41 of the UN Charter151 is an appropriate mechanism.  It allows sanctions to 
be placed on countries that violate norms of jus cogens through the use of embargoes, military 
action and sanctions.152Unfortunately difficulty arises when enforcing these said norms against 
permanent members of the security council, however in the security council’s resolution they 
stated that states must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their 
obligations under international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with 
international law, in particular, international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law.153  
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CLARIFICATION BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS ON THE NATURE 
AND SCOPE OF JUS COGENS.  
 International Courts need to play a more elaborate and activist role in the definition of Jus Cogens. 
Jus Cogens has been referred to in a number of judgments of both the Permanent Court of 
International Justice and the International Court of Justice as well as in dissenting and separate 
opinions of various judges.154 In various cases the courts have not been clarified on the nature, 
content or requirements of jus cogens155 In Questions Relating to the Obligation to Extradite or 
Prosecute156 questions as to the status of the prohibition against torture being enshrined with  jus 
cogens status have been entertained and deliberated over at length. The courts stated that the 
prohibition of torture is part of customary international law and it has become a peremptory 
norm.157 Furthermore the court elaborated on its elements averring that the prohibition is grounded 
in a widespread international practice and on the opinio juris of States,” that it appeared “in   
numerous international instruments of universal application”, that “it has been introduced into the 
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domestic law of almost all States”, and that “acts of torture are regularly denounced within national 
and international fora.158 This is an attempt by courts to elaborate on the substance surrounding jus 
cogens norms. In the courts making such pronouncements, then a light can be shed with regards 
to the nature, scope and consequences surrounding it. Due to the lack of a legislature, the courts 
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